



AND THE AVOIDANCE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
On the last day of the October Term, 1960, the Supreme Court's
two senior Justices took a majority of their brethren to task for
reading the union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act1 in a
sharply restrictive and, consequently, plainly constitutional man-
ner. Said Mr. Justice Black: 2
I think the Court is once more "carrying the doctrine of
avoiding constitutional questions to a wholly unjustifiable ex-
treme." In fact, I think the Court is actually rewriting [the
statute] to make it mean exactly what Congress refused to make
it mean. The very legislative history relied on by the Court
appears to me to prove that its interpretation.., is without
justification.... I think Congress has a right to a determination
of the constitutionality of the statute it passed, rather than to
have the Court rewrite the statute in the name of avoiding
decision of constitutional questions.
Harry H. Wellington is Professor of Law, Yale University.
1 Railway Labor Act, S 2 Eleventh, added by, 64 Star. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152
Eleventh (1958). See text infra, at note 32.
2 Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 784-85 (1961), quoting Clay v. Sun Insurance
Office, 363 U.S. 207, 213 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter reminded the majority of what Mr. Justice
Cardozo once had enunciated for the whole Court:
3
[A]voidance of a [constitutional] difficulty will not be pressed
to the point of disingenuous evasion. Here the intention of the
Congress is revealed too distinctly to permit us to ignore it
because of mere misgivings as to power. The problem must be
faced and answered.
Were these observations, each contained in a dissenting opinion
in Machinists v. Street,4 justified? In its effort to avoid constitu-
tional issues, how free should the Court have been with the Rail-
way Labor Act's language and history? These two related ques-
tions are the principal concern of this paper.5 Similar questions
could be asked about a number of relatively recent Supreme Court
cases.6 The avoidance of constitutional decision by statutory inter-
pretation is an important and persistent doctrine; yet its practice
has often brought forth angry, sometimes bitter, dissents.7 A close
look at the avoidance doctrine as practiced in Machinists v. Street
may illuminate some of the strengths and stresses of this method of
decision.
I. BACKGROUND: FACTUAL, JuDiCIAL, AND LEGISLATIVE
S. B. Street had no choice. If he wanted to keep his job, he
had to join the International Association of Machinists, the union
that represented him in collective bargaining. His employer was a
carrier in the Southern Railway System. Southern and the Ma-
3 Id. at 799, quoting Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933).
4 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
5 Street raises many additional questions of a provocative nature. For example,
its relation to the Court's performance in the "integrated bar case," Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), would make a fascinating study. Inquiry into whether
the remedies suggested by the Court in Street would effectuate the policies that
the Court found in § 2 Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, supra note 1, would
be profitable. And examination of the case's learning as to class actions would be
a worthwhile effort. I have been forced to eschew these intriguing problems be-
cause of an inflexible publishing deadline.
8 See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S.
474 (1959). Cf. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
7See, e.g., the dissent of Mr. Justice Clark in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,
510 (1959). The Justice's estimate of the Court's performance is captured in one
short sentence of his opinion: "This sleight of hand is too much for me." Id. at 511.
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chinists had a union shop contract, privately negotiated against a
background of Section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, the
federal statute permitting such an arrangement.8 Street probably
did not want to join the Machinists at all. He clearly objected to
the union using his dues to support legislation and legislators he op-
posed. He complained to the union; then he went to court to stop
the practice.
It is doubtful that many informed lawyers thought Street's
chances in court were very good.9 In the first place, there was no ex-
press restriction in agreement or statute prohibiting the union from
using dues to engage in politics. Moreover, neither agreement nor
statute was readily susceptible to an interpretation prohibiting such a
use.10 In the second place, unions had been in politics for a long time,
spending money to support a legislator here, a governor there, and
legislation deemed favorable to labor's cause everywhere." Most
important, however, was the unanimous judgment of the Court in
1956 in Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson.12 Like Street, Han-
son had worked for a railroad and had been represented by a union
with a contract calling for membership. He had resisted joining
the union, arguing that the requirement of compulsory member-
ship contravened the First and Fifth Amendments of the Constitu-
tion. His theory was that such a requirement interfered with "the
right to work, which the court has frequently included in the con-
cept of 'liberty' within the meaning of the Due Process Clauses,"'
s Supra note 1.
9 See, e.g., Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 22
Onto ST. L. J. 39, 63 (1961): "Stripped of all its disguises, the Street case ... emerges
as simply another attack on the validity of the union shop; and the issues it raises
are neither novel nor particularly significant."
10The relevant agreement is reproduced in Record, pp. 205-17. The relevant
statute is Railway Labor Act, § 2 Eleventh, added by 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45
U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1958). See text infra, at note 32.
11 The amicus brief for the AFL-CIO contains a good, short, and uncontroverted
historical survey of the political and legislative activities of American labor from
its colonial beginnings. See Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae, pp. 14-28.
"A look at the history of union political action supplies abundant proof that
labor's interest in politics is as old as its interest in the closed shop or the union
shop." Id. at 14.
12 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
13 Id. at 234.
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and that it "forces men into ideological and political associations
which violate their right to freedom of conscience, freedom of as-




Hanson was totally unsuccessful. The Court held "that the re-
quirement for financial support of the collective-bargaining agency
by all who receive the benefits of its work is within the power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause and does not violate either
the First or Fifth Amendments." '15 The Court's opinion, however,
did go on to say that if it were shown that "the exaction of dues,
initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover for forcing ideologi-
cal conformity or other action in contravention of the First Amend-
ment, this judgment will not prejudice the decision in that case";' 6
and that if union assessments "are in fact imposed for purposes not
germane to collective bargaining, a different problem would be
presented."'"
It did not seem, however, that Street was able to tell the courts
anything about the political activities of unions that Hanson had
not already brought to their attention. Nor would one suppose
from a reading of the complaint that Street had made his points in
a significantly more persuasive way than his predecessor had con-
trived to do.' 8 All in all, Mr. Justice Frankfurter certainly described
what must have appeared to be the case to most trained observers:' 9
The record before the Court in Hanson clearly indicated that
dues would be used to further what are normally described as
political and legislative. ends. And it surely can be said that
the Court was not ignorant of a fact that everyone else knew.
Union constitutions were in evidence which authorized the use
of union funds for political magazines, for support of lobbying
groups, and for urging union members to vote for union ap-
proved candidates. The contention now raised by [Street] was
succinctly stated by the Hanson plaintiffs in their brief. We
indicated that we were deciding the merits of the complaint on
all the allegations and proofs before us. "On the present record,
there is no more an infringement or impairment of First Amend-
14 d. at 236. 18 Ibid.
15 Id. at 238. 17 d. at 235.
's See Record, pp. 1-14, 17-31, 58-60, 71-84.
'9 367 US. at 804-805.
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ment rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who
by state law is required to be a member of an integrated bar."
351 U.S., at page 238.
One would suppose that Hanson's reasoning disposed of the
present suit...
The state courts of Georgia, however, where Street initiated his
litigation, 20 took the position that Street had demonstrated a use of
dues by his union that constituted, in the language of Hanson, "a
cover for forcing ideological conformity ... in contravention of
the First Amendment." 2' The Georgia courts relied on evidence
that showed only that the defendant union had spent money for
the usual union-supported political and legislative causes. 22 This the
union had done openly.23
Hanson had complained about just those kinds of expenditures
five years earlier.2 4 But in the Supreme Court seven Justices appar-
ently concurred25 in that part of the Court's opinion which an-
nounced:
26
20 The appellate history of the case is as follows: ReV'd dismissal of petition
sub nor. Looper v. Georgia So. & Fla. Ry, 213 Ga. 279 (1957); International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Street, 215 Ga. 27 (1959), probable jurisdiction noted, 361 U.S. 807
(1959), case set down for reargument because Attorney General of the United
States not notified that constitutionality of a federal statute was in issue, 363 U.S.
825 (1961), decided, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
21 351 U.S. at 238.
22 See Record, pp. 165-205.
2 3 "It will come as startling and fanciful news to the railroad unions and the
whole labor movement that in using union funds for promoting and opposing
legislative measures of concern to their members they were engaged in under-
cover operations." 367 U.S. at 805.
24 See Brief for Appellee, pp. 16-17, 65, Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson,
351 U.S. 225 (1956).
25 Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. On the meaning of
Hanson and on the question of statutory interpretation, his opinion was joined
by the Chief Justice and by Justices Clark, Whittaker, and Stewart. Justices Black
and Douglas agreed with the Court's reading of Hanson. They disagreed with the
Court's interpretation of the statute, as did Justices Frankfurter and Harlan.
The Court split differently on the question of the proper remedy. Mr. Justice
Whittaker declined to go along with the Court's suggestions on this subject, which
were as follows: "One remedy would be an injunction against expenditure for
political causes opposed by the complaining employee of a sum, from those moneys
to be spent by the union for political purposes, which is so much of the moneys
28 Id. at 749.
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[A]II that was held in Hanson was that § 2, Eleventh was con-
stitutional in its bare authorization of union-shop contracts
requiring workers to give "financial support" to unions legally
authorized to act as their collective bargaining agents. We sus-
tained this requirement-and only this requirement-embodied
in the statutory authorization of agreements under which "all
employees shall become members of the labor organization
representing their craft or class." We clearly passed neither
upon forced association in any other aspect nor upon the issue
of the use of exacted money for political causes which were
opposed by the employees.
The seven agreed, too, that "the record in [Street] is adequate
squarely to present constitutional questions reserved in Hanson."27
Justices Black and Douglas confronted these constitutional ques-
tions. Said Mr. Justice Black:
28
In my views, § 2, Eleventh can constitutionally authorize no
more than to make a worker pay dues to a union for the sole
purpose of defraying the cost of acting as his bargaining agent.
Our Government has no more power to compel individuals to
support union programs or union publications than it has to
compel the support of political programs, employer programs
or church programs. And the First Amendment, fairly con-
strued, deprives the Government of all power to make any per-
son pay out one single penny against his will to be used in any
way to advocate doctrines or views he is against, whether
economic, scientific, political, religious or any other.
And Mr. Justice Douglas was no less rigid:
29
It may be said that the election of a Franklin D. Roosevelt rather
than a Calvin Coolidge might be the best possible way to serve
the cause of collective bargaining. But even such a selective use
of union funds for political purposes subordinates the individ-
ual's First Amendment rights to the views of the majority. I
do not see how that can be done, even though the objector re-
tains his rights to campaign, to speak, to vote as he chooses. For
exacted from him as is the proportion of the union's total expenditures made for
such political activities to the union's total budget. .. . A second remedy would
be restitution to an individual employee of that portion of his money which the
union expended, despite his notification, for the political causes to which he had
advised the union he was opposed." 367 U.S. at 774-75. To make a majority on
the question of the remedy, Mr. Justice Douglas "concluded dubitante to agree.
.. " Id. at 779.
27 Ibid. 28 Id. at 791. 29 Id. at 778.
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when union funds are used for that purpose, the individual is
required to finance political projects against which he may be
in rebellion.
With the previously noted disapproval of their two senior col-
leagues, 0 the Court's majority of five, however, avoided any con-
stitutional issues through statutory interpretation.
Section 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act, the subject of
this consideration, was enacted by Congress in 1951. It is similar in
language, and seemingly in purpose, to its counterpart in the Taft-
Hartley Act.3 ' The major difference is that union shops in the rail-
road industry are permitted "[n]otwithstanding any.., law.., of
any State." Union and carrier may negotiate an agreement:
3 2
requiring as a condition of continued employment, that within
sixty days following the beginning of [their] employment...
all employees shall become members of the labor organization
... provided, that no such agreements shall require such condi-
tion of employment with respect to employees to whom mem-
bership is not available upon the same terms ... as are generally
applicable to any other member or with respect to employees
to whom membership 'was denied or terminated for any rea-
son other than the failure of the employee to tender the peri-
odic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines
and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring
or retaining membership.
The task the majority set for itself was to construe this language
to deny "the authority to a union, over the employee's objection,
to spend his money for political causes which he opposes. 33 It set
about performing this seemingly difficult task by a selective read-
ing of "the legislative history of § 2, Eleventh in the context of the
development of unionism in the railroad industry under the regula-
tory scheme created by the Railway Labor Act.... " In examin-
ing this history, the majority was plainly impressed by several phe-
nomena. First, it noted that railroad unions traditionally had not
been especially interested, for philosophical and economic reasons,
30 See text supra, at notes 2 and 3.
3161 Star. 140, 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a) (3), 158 (b) (2) (1958).
32 Railway Labor Act, § 2 Eleventh, added by, 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 US.C.
S 152 Eleventh (1958). (Emphasis added.)
33 367 U.S. at 750. 34 Ibid.
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in union security. Accordingly, these unions had not insisted upon
the union or closed-shop contract in negotiating with carriers. Sec-
ond, the Court observed that Congress in 1934 had prohibited un-
ion security contracts on the railroads and that this flat prohibition
had continued until the passage of Section 2, Eleventh in 1951.3r
These facts afforded the Court its point of departure for assessing
what Congress had done and what it had not done when it reversed
its 1934 position. As the Court put it:36
The appellant unions, in insisting that § 2, Eleventh contem-
plates their use of exacted funds to support political causes
objected to by the employee, would have us hold that Congress
sanctioned an expansion of historical practices in the political
area by the rail unions.... Both by tradition and, from 1934 to
1951, by force of law, the rail unions did not rely upon the com-
pulsion of union security agreements to exact money to support
the political activities in which they engage.
The Court discovered that in 1950-51 the unions had called to the
attention of Congress: (1) that the union's obligation under the Rail-
way Labor Act was to represent all employees, non-union as well as
union;3 7 (2) that under the Railway Labor Act and in the railroad
industry this was an expensive business; and (3) that this expense
should be shared by all employees.38 The Court said:3 9
The conclusion to which this history clearly points is that § 2,
Eleventh contemplated compulsory unionism to force em-
ployees to share the costs of negotiating and administering col-
lective agreements, and the costs of adjustment and settlement
of disputes. One looks in vain for any suggestion that Congress
also meant in § 2, Eleventh to provide the unions with a means
for forcing employees, over their objection, to support political
causes which they oppose.
This may be true. It is, of course, also true that "one looks in
vain" for language in Section 2, Eleventh" prohibiting unions from
35This portion of the Court's opinion appears under the heading "The Rail
Unions and Union Security." Ibid.
36 Id. at 770.
37 The union's obligation under the statute is to represent fairly all employees-
members and non-members, dissenters and advocates-in the bargaining unit. See
Steele v. Louisville & N. R. R, 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
38 367 U.S. at 762-63. 39 Id. at 763-64. 40 See text supra, at note 32.
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forcing employees "to support political causes which they oppose."
And in 1950-51, even as today, it was not a secret, or at least not a
well-kept secret, that unions used money obtained from employees
for political as well as economic activities. The Court took notice
of this:
41
We may assume that Congress was ... fully conversant with
the long history of intensive involvement of the railroad unions
in political activities. But it does not follow that §2, Eleventh
places no restriction on the use of an employee's money, over
his objection, to support political causes he opposes merely be-
cause Congress did not enact a comprehensive regulatory
scheme covering expenditures. For it is abundantly clear that
Congress did not completely ab2ndon the policy of full free-
dom of choice embodied in the 1934 Act, but rather made in-
roads on it for the limited purpose of eliminating the problems
created by the "free rider." That policy survives in § 2, Eleventh
in the safeguards intended to protect freedom of dissent. Con-
gress was aware of the conflicting interests involved in the ques-
tion of the union shop and sought to achieve their accommo-
dation.
The difficulty with this conclusion is that an examination of the
language of Section 2, Eleventh indicates that, although a congres-
sional accommodation of the "conflicting interests involved in the
question of the union shop" was indeed achieved, the resulting ac-
commodation imposed no restrictions on union expenditures. Rather,
it appears that Congress followed closely the accommodations
worked out in 1947 after an extensive review of the union security
problems that had emerged subsequent to enactment of the Wagner
Act.42 The background of these accommodations is legislative his-
tory that the Court chose to ignore.
In the Wagner Act, Congress had placed no prohibitions on the
negotiation and enforcement of union security agreements.4 s Un-
41367 U.S. at 767.
42 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958).
43 "Under [the Wagner Act] a proviso to section 8(3) permits voluntary agree-
ments for compulsory union membership provided they are made with an un-
assisted labor organization representing a majority of the employees at the time
the contract is made." S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1947).
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ions and employers could make a closed-shop contract 4 and where
such a contract was made, an applicant for work had to be a mem-
ber of the union to qualify for employment. Furthermore, under a
closed shop, or indeed, a "common-law" union shop, an employee
had to remain in good standing in his union in order to keep his
job. Expulsion from the union for any reason, such as a disagree-
ment with the leadership, meant loss of employment.45
The unions that were regulated by the Wagner Act, unlike the
railroad unions, were intensely interested in union security.4 They
bargained for the closed shop, frequently with success. 47 Some-
times their success meant that the dissenting employee lost his job.
This penalty placed upon dissent led to changes embodied in the
Taft-Hartley Act.48 Taft-Hartley goes far to separate job security
from union membership. Under a statutory union shop all an em-
ployee need do to protect his job is "tender the periodic dues and
initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or re-
taining [union] membership.... ." The employee need not main-
tain good standing in the union. And, of course, he need not be a
member of the union at the time of his employment. 0
44 This was true at least where state law did not prohibit such contracts. "When
the committees of the Congress in 1935 reported the bill which became the present
National Labor Relations Act, they made clear that the proviso in section 8(3) was
not intended to override State laws regulating the closed-shop." Ibid.
45 "Numerous examples were presented to the committee of the way union leaders
have used closed-shop devices as a method of depriving employees of their jobs,
and in some cases a means of securing a livelihood in their trade, or calling, for
purely capricious reasons. In one instance a union member was subpoenaed to
appear in court, having witnessed an assault upon his foreman by a fellow em-
ployee. Because he told the truth upon the witness stand, the union leadership
brought about his expulsion with a consequent loss of his job since his employer
was subject to a closed-shop contract" Id. at 7.
46 See Golden & Ruttenberg, The Union Shop Is Democratic and Necessary, in
BARmE & KERR, UNIONS, MANA AmENT AmD THm PuBLic 129 (1948).
47 "Until the beginning of the war only a relatively small minority of employees
(less than 20 per-cent) were affected by contracts containing any compulsory
features. According to the Secretary of Labor, however, within the last 5 years
over 75 per-cent now contain some form of compulsion:' S. Rep. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947).
48 61 Stat. 140, 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. S§ 158(a) (3), 158(b) (5) (1958).
See H.R. Rep. No. 510,80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1947).
4961 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1958).
50 "The policy of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from their organizational
rights. Thus § 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) were designed to allow employees to freely
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The congressional hearings that led to the Taft-Hartley changes
focused on these job control problems.51 While there was some
discussion in Congress about the use of funds obtained under a urf-
ion shop for political purposes, it was neither extensive nor sys-
tematic.52 The question of the use of funds for political purposes
received almost no attention when Congress in 1951 reversed itself
and permitted the union shop on the railroads.53 Congress accom-
plished this by enacting Section 2, Eleventh in the same language
as the Taft-Hartley union-shop provisions. The statutes are twins.s
Is it not fair then to surmise that Congress, when it enacted Section
2, Eleventh, was attempting to do no more than roughly to con-
form the law of union security in the railroad industry to that in
exercise their right to join unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members, or abstain
from joining any union without imperiling their livelihood. The only limitation
Congress has chosen to impose on this right is specified in the proviso to § 8(a) (3)
which authorizes employers to enter into certain union security contracts, but
prohibits discharge under such contracts if membership 'was not available to the
employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members'
or if 'membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure
of the employee to tender the periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required
as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership."' Radio Officers' Union v.
N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
51 See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
5 2 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 55 before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 796-808, 1004, 1425, 1687, 2145 (1947); Hearings on
H.R. 8 before the House Committee on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
305 (1947).
53 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 2262, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); H.R. Rep. No. 2811,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). But see 96 CONG. REc. 17049-50 (1951).
G4 "[N]o employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for non-
membership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing
that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and
conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other
than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.. . :' Taft-
Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1958).
"[No union shop] agreement shall require such condition of employment with
respect to employees to whom membership is not available upon the same terms ...
as are generally applicable to any other member or with respect to employees to
whom membership was denied or terminated for any reason other than the failure
of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not
including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership." Railway Labor Act § 2, Eleventh, added by, 64 Stat. 1238
(1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1958).
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industries regulated by the Taft-Hartley Act? This was possible
in 1950-51, if not earlier, because of the disappearance of the com-
pany union. As the Senate Report recognized: 5
The present prohibitions against all forms of union security
agreements ... were made part of the Railway Labor Act in
1934. They were enacted into law against the background of
employer use of these agreements as devices for establishing
and maintaining company unions, thus effectively depriving a
substantial number of employees of their right to bargain col-
lectively .... Since the enactment of the 1934 Amendments
company unions have practically disappeared.
When the text of Section 2, Eleventh and its particular history is
projected against this background of the language and history of
the Taft-Hartley Act's union security provisions, it is not easy to
read Section 2, Eleventh the way the Street majority did. It is not,
however, impossible to do so. And, for reasons now to be discussed,
it might be thought that the canon of statutory interpretation, that
counsels that a statute be read to avoid a serious constitutional ques-
tion," required just the reading that the Street majority settled
upon.
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR AVOIDANCE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL QUEsTION
No matter what the reasons for the 1934 congressional pro-
hibition upon railroad union-shop contracts, there seems to be little
55 S. Rep. No. 2262, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1950).
56 The canon is easy to explain where, in its absence, a court could, with equal
plausibility, interpret a statute in either of two ways. "It is elementary when the
constitutionality of a statute is assailed, if the statute be reasonably susceptible of
two interpretations, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other
valid, it is our plain duty to adopt that construction which will save the statute
from constitutional infirmity. Knights Templars' Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187
U.S. 197, 205. And unless this rule be considered as meaning that our duty is to
first decide that a statute is unconstitutional and then proceed to hold that such
ruling was unnecessary because the statute is susceptible of a meaning, which causes
it not to be repugnant to the Constitution, the rule plainly must mean that where
a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided,
our duty is to adopt the latter. Harriman v. Interstate Com. Comm., 211 U.S. 407."
United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 407-
408 (1909). See ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TM
UNITm STATES 486 (Wolfson & Kurland ed. 1951).
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question that such contracts were in fact effectively prohibited un-
til 1951.Y This absence of the union shop afforded maximum free-
dom to the dissenting railroad employee. 58 When Congress changed
the law in 1951 and removed the legal restrictions it earlier had
placed upon the union shop, one could have predicted that the re-
sult would be a diminution of the dissenting employee's freedom.
In determining how much of a diminution Congress meant to allow,
should not the presumption be: not one bit more than is clearly
provided for in the statute?
It is to be remembered that, in the absence of escape through
statutory interpretation, the Court believed that its duty lay in de-
ciding the constitutionality of the union's use, for political pur-
poses, of dues obtained from protesting employees under compul-
sion of law.59 This constitutional decision would have to be made
in a situation where it was fairly clear that Congress itself had not
confronted the question whether it was necessary to restrict indi-
vidual freedom to this extent.60 Congress had not said unequivo-
cally: we, the people's representatives, believe that such a restric-
tion on individual freedom is necessary in this situation. Congress
should have a chance to do this-or to decline to do this-before it is
taken to have done it. How can the Court defer to Congress on a
constitutional issue when it is not clear that Congress has made a
judgment to be deferred to? In the alternative, how can the Court
justify the exercise of its extraordinary and ultimate power, name-
ly, to make a declaration of unconstitutionality, when it is not clear
that congressional action has compelled a decision on the constitu-
tional issue?
Consider the case of Kent v. Dulles6l as an analogous statutory
57 "The union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act was written into the
law in 1951. Prior to that date the Railway Labor Act prohibited union shop
agreements. 48 Stat. 1186, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Fourth and Fifth; 40 Op. Atty. Gen.
254." Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231 (1956).
58 This is just to say that the employee who disagreed with the policies of the
union was free not to join the union. He was not free, however, of union representa-
tion. He could not, for example, effect his own wage-bargain with his employer.
See Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342
(1944). Cf. J. I. Case Co. v. N.L.RB., 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
59 "The record in this case is adequate squarely to present constitutional ques-
tions reserved in Hanson." 367 U.S. at 749.
00 See text supra, at notes 51-53. 01357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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interpretation dictated by a desire to avoid a constitutional con-
frontation. The Court there limited the seemingly unrestricted
power over passports delegated to the Secretary of State by Con-
gress. The Secretary, in denying a passport to a citizen because of
his alleged beliefs and associations, had acted as if the delegation
were in fact an unrestricted one. To be sure, Congress had not spe-
cifically said that the Secretary could deny passports and restrict
travel to the extent that he had. But just as surely the Secretary was
not unreasonable in interpreting the delegation as an authorization
of his actions. Yet, if the Court had read the enabling statute to
cover the Secretary's actions, it would have had to subject those
actions to close scrutiny in order to ascertain whether they trans-
gressed the Fifth Amendment's protection of the right to travel.
The Court would have had to hold either that the Secretary had
been authorized to act and indeed had acted unconstitutionally or
that authorized governmental action, drastically restricting an in-
dividual's freedom to travel, was constitutional, even though Con-
gress had not itself clearly determined that such restriction was
necessary.
62
Surely the Court's holding that the Secretary's actions were un-
authorized was preferable to either of these alternatives.63 Before
governmental restriction upon individual freedom is held to be ei-
ther unconstitutional or constitutional, it should be absolutely clear
to a majority of the Supreme Court that Congress has faced the
issue squarely and determined clearly that in its judgment it was
necessary to impose the restriction. 64 It is one thing for the Court,
62,"To repeat, we deal here with a constitutional right of the citizen, a right
which we must assume Congress will be faithful to respect. We would be faced
with important constitutional questions were we to hold that Congress . . . had
given the Secretary authority to withhold passports to citizens because of their
beliefs or associations. Congress has made no such provision in explicit terms; and
absent one, the Secretary may not employ that standard to restrict the citizens'
right of free movement." Id. at 130.
63 For an analogous case, see Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
64 In both Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), and Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474 (1959), the Court was strongly influenced by a delegation problem closely
related to the avoidance doctrine. "In many circumstances, where the Govern-
ments freedom to act is clear, and the Congress or the President has provided gen-
eral standards of action and has acquiesced in administrative interpretation, dele-
gation may be inferred... . But this case does not present that situation. We deal
here with substantial restraints on employment opportunities of numerous persons
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largely in deference to a clear determination of necessity by the
governmental institution closest to the people, to hold constitu-
tional a previously questionable action. It is quite another thing for
the Court to hold action constitutional where the people's repre-
sentatives have not themselves declared in clear language that in-
dividual freedom must be curtailed because of an overriding na-
tional need. Is not this canon of statutory interpretation really a
corollary of the doctrine of judicial self-restraint in constitutional
adjudication?65
In the Street case, moreover, there may be an additional, if some-
what related, justification for the Court to avoid constitutional de-
cision by interpreting the statute as it did. It had been assumed
that if the Court faced the constitutional question in Street, it would
have been forced either to validate or to invalidate all of the un-
imposed in a manner which is in conflict with our long-accepted notions of fair
procedures. Before we are asked to judge whether, in the context of security
clearance cases, a person may be deprived of the right to follow his chosen
profession without full hearings where accusers may be confronted, it must be
made clear that the President or Congress, within their respective constitutional
powers, specifically has decided that the imposed procedures are necessary and
warranted and has authorized their use. Such decisions ... must be made explicitly
not only to assure that individuals are not deprived of cherished rights under
procedures not actually authorized .... but also because explicit action, especially
in areas of doubtful constitutionality, requires careful and purposeful considera-
tion by those responsible for enacting and implementing our laws. Without explicit
action by lawmakers, decisions of great constitutional import and effect would
be relegated by default to administrators who, under our system of government, are
not endowed with authority to decide them." Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,
506-507 (1959).
This delegation problem is present in Street in a somewhat different, but
closely related form. The union stands in the position of the administrator, and
makes "decisions of great constitutional import and effect." It might well be argued
that power to make these decisions must be delegated to unions explicitly, for the
same reasons that power must be delegated explicitly to administrators.
65 Cf. Harlan, J., concurring in Greene: "Unlike my brother CR. who finds
this case 'both clear and simple,' I consider the constitutional issue it presents most
difficult and far-reaching.... For present purposes no more need be said than
that we should not be drawn into deciding the constitutionality of the security-
clearance revocation procedures employed in this case until the use of such
procedures in matters of this kind has been deliberately considered and expressly
authorized by the Congress or the President who alone are in a position to evaluate
in the first instance the totality of factors bearing upon the necessity for their
use. That much the courts are entitled to before they are asked to express a con-
stitutional judgment upon an issue fraught with such important consequences both
to the Government and the citizen" Id. at 509.
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ion's political expenditures made from dues obtained from protest-
ing employees. This, however, would seem to be an erroneous as-
sumption. Unless one is quite absolute about First Amendment
problems, one cannot tell whether a dissenting employee's First
Amendment rights have been abridged without considering the
needs of the union. This entails taking a close look at the particular
expenditures and the particular union making the expenditures. 6
Union political activity may be a substitute for action on the
economic front. The union that is economically weak may decide
to use its money to press for legislation that will shore up its bar-
gaining position. It may do this, for example, by supporting candi-
dates publicly committed to work for the liberalization of statutory
restrictions on the use of secondary boycotts. If the tactic is suc-
cessful, other unions will be better able to aid the weak union when
next it engages in economic combat. Thus a weak union may be
able to demonstrate a greater need to participate in politics than a
strong union. The need of any one union to engage in political ac-
tivity is likely to keep pace with changes in the relevant law of
collective bargaining, the national and international economic cli-
mate, the employer's economic strength, and the acceleration or
diminution of employer political activities. Furthermore, this need
may vary depending on the object of the expenditure. In Street: 7
[N]umerous union activities and expenditures of different
kinds [were] drawn in question. They range from testimony
by union officials before legislative committees, and solicita-
tion at union meetings of voluntary contributions to political
organizations, to the use of union funds for political cam-
paigns; from the endorsement of political candidates by unions
and their periodicals, to "interpretive" and "non-objective"
news articles by such journals; from union support of legisla-
tion concerning wages, hours, and working conditions to sup-
port of legislation pertaining to housing, farm programs and
foreign aid; and from legislative activities and expenditures by
the local lodge, to legislative and political activities and expendi-
tures by the AFL-CIO.... These different kinds of expendi-
tures and activities. .. may well involve differing considera-
tions. For instance, support of legislation concerning wages and
hours might be considered more "germane" to collective bar-
66 See Brief for the United States, pp. 23-3 1.
6 7 Id. at 18.
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gaining than support of legislation involving farm programs;
and the majority of the union members may have an interest in
associating together to publish their views in a newspaper,
which interest may be entitled to greater protection than their
interest in having the union render financial support to the
campaign of a particular political candidate.
It is against ever changing, ever different union needs, perhaps
considered in conjunction with other factors, such as the extent of
internal democracy within the union, that the Court must test the
impact of union action upon a dissenting employee, if it is to decide
whether and when the employee's First Amendment rights have
been transgressed.
68
How well qualified is the Court as an institution to assess the un-
ion's need to act in the way that it does in these different situations?
Why should we expect the Court to be able to do a good job when
it reviews a union's judgments on the question whether union ac-
tion is necessary? Where will the judge find applicable standards?
Must he not either turn to his own predilections or abjure judg-
ment and approve the union action?
To be sanguine about the Court's ability to perform this task sat-
isfactorily requires one to expunge from memory many events that
make up an important part of the history of labor relations and the
law. For the question of the propriety of union expenditures may
not be very different from one that asks whether a union is privi-
leged to use a particular kind of concerted economic activity, e.g.,
picketing, to achieve a desired economic goal-a union shop.69 In
many courts, the question of privilege has turned on a judge's as-
sessment of the union's needs and the legitimacy of the union's in-
68 'No extensive discussion is necessary to show that the issues raised by the
parties are of great constitutional importance, and, at least in some instances, involve
a delicate balancing of legitimate but conflicting interests. On the one side are
the interests of the dissenting minority employees, required by the union shop
agreement to join the union at the price of continued employment, not to have
their money used to advance candidates and causes which they abhor, and to be
free of undue influence.... On the other side are the Congressional policy...
that the expenses of the collective bargaining agency, which represents and brings
benefits to all of the employees of a given craft or classification, should be borne
by all, and the interests of the majority of the employees to associate together to
take lawful action they deem appropriate to advance their organizational goals."
id. at 28-29.
69 See Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HAiv. L. Rv. 1 (1894).
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terest.70 But the union's needs, as a judge saw them, often were
based-and necessarily so-upon his personal predilections. 71 There
were few objective standards for a judge to employ when assessing
the legitimacy of union conduct.72 And so, as the record demon-
strates, this method of resolving labor problems failed.73 The courts
were the wrong institution to do the required job.74
On the basis of this analogy, must not the prognosis be that the
Court is likely to do a poor job if it undertakes to determine which
union political expenditures are constitutional? Is it not important
70Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Vegelahn v. Gunther, 167
Mass. 92 (1896), and Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492 (1900). See, e.g., Wilson v.
Hacker, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. Erie Co, 1950).
71 "The ground of decision really comes down to a proposition of policy of
rather a delicate nature concerning the merit of the particular benefit to them-
selves intended by the defendants, and suggests a doubt whether judges wtih
different economic sympathies might not decide such a case differently when
brought face to face with the issue." Holmes, supra note 69, at 8.
72 "But it does seem futile not to admit that the making of such choices is essen-
tially a function of our political life. If it is, then such choices are not for our
courts to make. They are, rather, matters for our legislatures to handle, within the
framework of our state and federal constitutions." GREGORY, LABOR AN EaM LAW 85
(1946).
73 See generally FRA NKrA-r a & GaEN, TBE LABOR INJUNcrION (1930).
74 In these cases, the courts tried to second-guess unions and to determine
whether the needs of the union made the union's use of economic activity privileged.
In contrast, consider the behavior of courts in the "fair-representation" area.
The union has a duty to represent all employees fairly. Steele v. Louisville &
N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). When, a union discriminates on the basis of race
it is easy for a court to test the discrimination by using the equal protection clause
-by analogy-as a standard. Where the discrimination is economic, the courts have
used the same standard. Very few economic distinctions taken by a union in col-
lective bargaining can be said to be unreasonable. Accordingly, union conduct
in the non-racial area is almost never upset. Query if a reasonableness test adequately
protects minority groups in bargaining units? Query if it does not mean that the
courts have really abdicated, and declined to exercise any meaningful role as a
reviewing tribunal? The reason courts have acted this way is easy to explain: they
do not have standards by which to judge union conduct. The situation is unhappy,
if you believe, as I do, that the reasonableness standard is not adequate to the task.
But the courts are not at fault. See generally Wellington, Union Democracy and
Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE LJ.
1327,1339-43 (1958).
The "privilege" cases and the "fair-representation" cases show the alternatives
available to judges in the absence of objective standards. Neither solution is a
happy one.
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then that the Court-if language permits-read the statute to avoid
such a misallocation of institutional responsibility within the gov-
ernment?
75
The combination of considerations just examined tends to lead
to the conclusion that the Court in Machinists v. Street was correct
after all in its narrow interpretation of Section 2, Eleventh of the
Railway Labor Act. But several additional factors must be weighed.
And they must be placed on the other side of the scales.
III. REASONs To ANSWER THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
It is quite possible that the Court has, by its action in Street,
prohibited unions from using money obtained from dissenting em-
ployees for purposes that realistically cannot be said to raise serious
constitutional difficulties. No matter how economically strong the
union, its expenditures in support of legislation dealing directly
with collective bargaining would seem to present such a situation.76
After all, it must be remembered that in collective bargaining mat-
ters the union, by law long deemed constitutional, represents dis-
75 Consider, as a further example of this proposition, litigation under the provi-
sion of the Taft-Hartley Act allowing suit in a federal district court by a union
or employer for breach of a collective bargaining contract. Taft-Hartley Act,
§ 301, 61 Star. 156 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958). Taft-Hartley gives
few guides as to the rules courts should apply in litigation under this provision.
Accordingly, it might well be thought that the task Congress seemed to be impos-
ing on its courts-developing from scratch a full-blown code for collective bar-
gaining agreements-was a task that institutionally they could not perform well.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter was of this view: "judicial intervention is ill-suited to
the special characteristics of the arbitration process in labor disputes. .. ." Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 463 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
Assuming the courts are "ill-suited" to the task Congress has seemingly bestowed
upon them in a statute, is it not appropriate for the Court to read such a statute,
if it is at all possible for it to do so, in a way that narrows it drastically and mini-
mizes the misallocation of institutional responsibilities within society? See Bickel &
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case,
71 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1957). This was the course a majority of the Supreme Court
first embarked on, see Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955), but later abandoned, see Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
76 "[O]pposition to proposed legislation, such as a wages and hours bill or a
statute outlawing union shop agreements, which directly affects the strength and
bargaining power of the union is clearly 'germane' to collective bargaining...
Brief for the United States, p. 32. (Emphasis added.)
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senting employees as well as consenting employees;77 and that
"[tihe individual [union] member may express his views in any
public or private forum as freely as he could before the union col-
lected his dues. Federal taxes also may diminish the vigor with
which a citizen can give partisan support to a political belief, but as
yet no one would place such an impediment to making one's views
effective within the reach of constitutionally protected 'free
speech.' "78
If the majority's interpretation of Section 2, Eleventh does in
fact bar the union from using funds in ways that invoke no clear
constitutional barrier, the justification for such restrictive interpre-
tation of Section 2, Eleventh is surely not compelling. An interpre-
tation of the statute that forces the Court to face up to insubstantial
constitutional questions does not pose the many difficulties discussed
earlier that are implicit in the assumption that the constitutional
question was substantial. 79 By hypothesis the Court will not be
called upon to exercise its ultimate power of declaring legislation
unconstitutional. It may be called upon to validate a restriction on
individual freedom, but one that is not very serious, at least by the
standards of constitutional law. 0 This constitutional law is a part
of the background against which Congress enacted Section 2,
Eleventh. One might well argue that the natural implication of
what Congress has said and done in such a case should prevail."'
Looking at this another way, one can say that the Court's interpre-
tation of Section 2, Eleventh to the extent that it is more restrictive
of union power than is properly called for by serious constitutional
doubt, is better characterized as the regulation of collective bar-
77 Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Order of Railroad Tele-
graphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944); and see J. I. Case
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 US. 332 (1944).
78 367 U.S. at 806. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting.)
79 See text supra, at notes 56-65.
80 And in this area are there any other relevant standards available to the Court?
81 This is not advanced as a doctrine of universal application. One may well
agree with its application to the problem in Street and still agree with the Court
in Greene v. McElroy where it expressed its "concern that traditional forms of fair
procedure not be restricted by implication or without the most explicit action
by the Nation's law-makers, even in areas where it is possible that the Constitu-
tion presents no inhibitions." 360 U.S. at 508. (Emphasis added.) See also Bickel &
Wellington, supra note 75, at 31-34.
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gaining than as protection of individual freedom. Surely it need
not be argued that the role of the Court in dealing with the regula-
tion of collective bargaining should be as limited as possible.
It is not altogether clear, however, that the Court did construe
Section 2, Eleventh to avoid insubstantial constitutional questions,
e.g., direct support of legislation dealing with collective bargaining,
as well as to avoid substantial constitutional questions, e.g., support
of candidates for political office. The Court tells us only that:
82
We respect... congressional purpose when we construe § 2,
Eleventh as not vesting the unions with unlimited power to
spend exacted money. We are not called upon to delineate the
precise limits of that power in this case. We have before us
only the question whether the power is restricted to the extent
of denying the unions the right, over the employee's objection,
to use his money to support political causes which he opposes.
Its use to support candidates for public office, and advance po-
litical programs, is not a use which helps defray the expenses
of the negotiation or administration of collective agreements,
or the expenses entailed in the adjustment of grievances and
disputes. In other words, it is a use which falls clearly outside
the reasons advanced by the unions and accepted by Congress
why authority to make union-shop agreements was justified.
But, of course, money spent in support of some legislation, e.g.,
full crew laws, may make it unnecessary for the union to strike or
spend money in support of a bargaining demand. One might think
of the monetary expenditures as a collective bargaining activity by
means of political action, even as one might think of picketing as a
collective bargaining activity by means of "a form of speech."
83
The point is that the Court's language is ambiguous. Nowhere
did it undertake the task-perhaps because it is impossible-of dis-
tinguishing between political and collective bargaining activities.
Thus, while it seems probable that the Court meant by "political"
anything that has a political element in it, it is not absolutely clear
that the Court went this far. Notice, however, that if the Court did
82 367 U.S. at 768.
83 "[I]s the union's choice of when to picket or to go out on strike unconstitu-
tional? Picketing is still deemed also a form of speech, but surely the union's deci-
sion to strike under its statutory aegis as a bargaining unit is not an unconstitutional
compulsion forced upon members who strongly oppose a strike, as minorities
not infrequently do." Id, at 810 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting.)
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not go so far, it failed to eliminate the institutional problem that, in
part, justified its interpretation of Section 2, Eleventh. If in the
future the Court must decide whether the expenditure of money
by a union is for political or collective bargaining purposes, i.e., in
the language of Hanson, whether the money is used for purposes
"germane to collective bargaining," the Court must measure union
action in each case against nonexistent standards, in the same fash-
ion that courts in the past tried to determine whether unions seek-
ing various goals were privileged to use various types of concerted
action.
8 4
Thus, it seems that the Court, in Street, unhappily has contrived
to entangle itself in legislating about collective bargaining; and to
what end? One is forced to wonder whether the Court will escape
for very long the constitutional confrontation it so strenuously
worked to avoid. It is safe to predict that not many Terms will pass
before all of the issues the Court thought it was avoiding will be be-
fore it again. It will not be long before a dissenting employee asserts
that the Taft-Hartley's union shop is unconstitutional. When that
happens it will be difficult indeed for the Court to read Taft-Hartley
in the way in which it has read the Railway Labor Act. As we have
seen, it cannot be said that in 1947 Congress was cutting back on a
freedom it had earlier granted dissenting employees8 5 Nor can it
be asserted that unions regulated by Taft-Hartley had traditionally
been uninterested in union security."" These propositions were
made by the Street majority about congressional performance in
1951,87 and about unions regulated by the Railway Labor Act.8
They were advanced by that majority as weighty reasons for its
reading of Section 2, Eleventh. 9 They are not available as bases for
reaching a like conclusion in a Taft-Hartley case. The constitu-
tional questions left unresolved by Street will yet have to be re-
solved by the Court.
In view of these circumstances, the Court should have read Sec-
tion 2, Eleventh in a straightforward manner and faced up to a con-
stitutional decision. I further suggest that the proper constitutional
84 See text supra, at notes 65-75. 87 367 U.S. at 750-70.
85 See text supra, at notes 42-45. 88 Ibid.
86 See text supra, at notes 46-47. 89 Ibid.
[1961
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decision-one which would have avoided the difficulties with con-
stitutional decision noted earlier-would have been for the Court to
decline to test union conduct by constitutional standards.
IV. THE PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION
Mr. Justice Frankfurter spoke to the point in his dissent
in Street: 90
But were we to assume, arguendo, that the plaintiffs have al-
leged a valid constitutional objection if Congress had specifical-
ly ordered the result, we must consider the difference between
such compulsion and the absence of compulsion when Congress
acts as platonically as it did, in a wholly non-coercive way.
Congress has not commanded that the railroads shall employ
only those workers who are members of authorized unions.
Congress has only given leave to a bargaining representative,
democratically elected by a majority of the workers, to enter
into a particular contractual provision arrived at under the give-
and-take of duly safeguarded bargaining procedures .... When
we speak of the Government "acting" in permitting the union
shop, the scope and force of what Congress has done must be
heeded. There is not a trace of compulsion involved-no exer-
cise of restriction by Congress on the freedom of the carriers
and the unions. On the contrary, Congress expanded their free-
dom of action. Congress lifted limitations upon free action by
parties bargaining at arm's length.
What Congress did in 1951 in Section 2, Eleventh was to permit
private collective bargaining on the railroads to develop in its own
way, according to traditions and customs and the play of economic
power. Congress in Section 2, Eleventh removed governmental
control, both federal and state, from an area where such control
previously had existed. Private groups-labor unions and employers
-obtained freedom of choice. The exercise of this choice, as fre-
quently is the case with the exercise of all sorts of private choice,
may have a substantial impact on non-consenting individuals. This
is a powerful reason for governmental control of one sort or an-
other. But why must the instrument of control be the First Amend-
ment? Why should the validity of the exercise of union-employer
90 367 U.S. at 806-807,
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choice, any more than the validity of any other similar exercise of
private choice, be tested by constitutional standards?9
Three factors suggest that it should not be so tested. First, as we
have seen, the Court would be likely to do a bad job if it were to
test union action by constitutional standards.92 The Court would
have to determine the legitimacy of union action without any
objective way of ascertaining the necessity for union action. Sec-
ond, Congress, when it passed Section 2, Eleventh, did not think
through the consequences of the private ordering it was permitting,
as it would have had to think through the consequences of its
action if it were itself directly setting conditions of employment
for railroad workers. How could it? Congress in Section 2, Elev-
enth was expressing its faith in the superior ability of private groups
to work out some of the industrial problems facing the railroads.93
This suggests that the performance of Congress in 1951 gives no
reason to assume that Congress will not respond to the problems
now being revealed by experience under Section 2, Eleventh. To
the contrary, experience suggests Congress is likely to be quite
sensitive to the need for further legislation protecting the dissenting
employee. In the past, as Congress became aware of similar prob-
lems, it has acted forcefully. This, in part, is the story behind the
amendments to the union security provisions of Taft-Hardey. 4
In part, it is the story behind the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.95 Third, no existing legal doctrine compels
the Court to test union action by constitutional standards. Rather,
it would require an extension of existing doctrine, doctrine con-
tained in the landmark cases of Shelley v. Kraemer,96 Smith vu. All-
91 For a more detailed discussion of unions and governmental action, see Well-
ington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and "Governmental Action," 70 YALE
LJ. 345 (1961).
92 See text supra, at notes 65-75.
93 See S. Rep. No. 2262, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1950).
94 See, e.g., S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1947).
9573 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158, 159, 160, 164, 186, 187, 401, 402, 411-
15, 431-40, 461-66, 481-83, 501-504, 521-31 (Supp. 1959). See S. Rep. No. 1417, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
96 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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'wright 9 7 and Terry vu. Adams,"' to permit such a result.9 9 While
an extension of this doctrine to cover union action would not be
an illogical development of constitutional law,100 it would, if the
above considerations are valid, be a plainly unwise development.
V. CONCLUSION
The two senior Justices, whose words concerning the avoid-
ance of constitutional questions were quoted at the beginning of
this paper,10' were justified to this extent: the Court should not
have interpreted Section 2, Eleventh in the sharply restrictive man-
ner it did. That interpretation was unfortunate because in one way
or another it constituted judicial legislation about collective bar-
gaining. The courts have never done this well. Judges do not have
standards by which to test union action. They cannot ascertain
union needs. They act half in blindness, and the results are seldom
happy. In Street, the Court had no legitimate alternative to consti-
tutional decision. A proper constitutional decision would have dis-
posed of the case by rejecting the contention that the validity of a
union shop contract is to be tested by the requirements of the First
Amendment. That decision, which was one that the Court was
plainly competent to make,102 would have spared us a slick but
shallow performance in the delicate art of avoiding constitutional
questions through statutory interpretation.
07 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
98 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
99 Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson 351 U.S. 225 (1956), suggests that where,
absent § 2, Eleventh, state law would prohibit a union shop, governmental action is
made out. Id. at 231-32. What this means is difficult to say, but it is surely beyond
belief that it settles anything about unions and the constitution. See generally, Well-
ington, supra note 91, at 355-60.
100 See Wellington, supra note 91, at 358-60.
101 See text supra, at notes 2 and 3.
102 Like any decision of a serious constitutional question, it would have forced
the Court to work hard, because the problems the Court would have had to resolve
are difficult ones indeed. But the avoidance doctrine, of course, has nothing to do
with avoiding constitutional questions merely because they are hard.
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